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way to measure the force of the relevant goods: we lack a precise way to add
up the value of the goods on each side, just as we lack a precise way to
compare goods on one side with those on the other. At best we can make a
rough and ready assessment. Suppose we find, as well we might, that it is
not clear if the goods of mystery outweigh the goods of clarity. Whatever
may be the implications of such a discovery for theism, it would not provide
the basis for the sort of case for atheism that Schellenberg wishes to develop.
To conclude, Schellenberg writes in a religiously sensitive and philosophically interesting way, with a keen sense of what is important to his opponents.
His presentation of the views of others is insightful and balanced. Although
I am not persuaded by his central arguments, I am entirely persuaded that he
has shown that the fact that nonbelief is reasonable is a serious and deep
difficulty for theism. This is an important book.l
NOTE
I. Thanks to Valerie Hoffman and BiII Schaedel for helpful advice, and to John
Schellenberg for extensive comments.

Theology in the Age of Scientific Reasoning, by Nancey Murphy. Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1990. Pp. xii and 215. $31.50.

DEL RATZSCH, Calvin College.
Theology, Nancey Murphy believes, has been in the grip of an epistemological crisis since the days of Hume. The crisis resulted from the collapse of the
earlier epistemology of authority, combined with Hume's apparent demonstration that theology, whether revealed or natural, could not meet the new
empirical and foundationalist standards of probabilistic reasoning that had
emerged in connection with science. In her recent Theology in the Age of
Scientific Reasoning, Murphy, professor of Christian philosophy at Fuller
Theological Seminary, argues that advances within philosophy of science, which
represents the best present theories of rationality for probabilistic reasoning, give
theology the necessary resources to finally answer Hume's challenge.
The work is impressive in ambition, scope and execution, and any attempt
to employ contemporary philosophical weaponry against Hume's descendants
on what they have long considered to be their own turf is certainly welcome.
However, while sharing many of Murphy's intuitions and aims, I am not
totally convinced. I shall first recap the major directions of the book, then
indicate areas that may be problematic. But even if there are genuine problems, there is much of value here.
We can perhaps portray the gross structure of Hume's challenge (Chapter
1) as an argument roughly as follows. Theism is rationally justifiable only if
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it can meet the epistemological standards of probabilistic reasoning (science).
Those standards embody an empirically based foundationalism. Theism, however, cannot be constructed on an empirically based foundationalism, and
therefore, theism is not rationally justifiable.
Unfortunately, many modern theologies have conceded the premises, found
themselves staring at the resultant conclusion, and have blinked. Murphy in
effect accepts the first and third premises, but rejects the second-thus
shortcutting the original Humean challenge-accepting instead a Lakatosian
picture of rationality. That change renders the third irrelevant even if true,
but generates the possibility of still reaching the conclusion should it turn out
that theism could not be constructed within Lakatosian constraints. Murphy
then tries to show that such construction is possible-that "(potentially at
least) theology is methodologically indistinguishable from the sciences" (p.
198)-thus blocking even an updated Humean case.
On Lakatos's view (Chapter 3), the basic unit of rational evaluation is the
research program-a historical sequence of theory clusters, each cluster consisting of a non-negotiable theoretical 'hard core' surrounded by a 'protective
belt' of auxiliary hypotheses, with responses to challenges guided by a 'negative heuristic' which specifies what sorts of alterations are unacceptable, and
by a 'positive heuristic' which specifies what sorts of accommodations to new
data and various challenges should be pursued. Accommodation is usually
achieved by modifications within the protective belt. Acceptance is rational
if the program is empirically and theoretically progressive, but becomes irrational if the program is degenerative over a long enough haul, although
there is no precise specification of 'long enough.' A research program is
theoretically and empirically progressive only if successive members of the
sequence retain what was apparently right in their predecessors in the sequence, and expand the empirical reach of the program by generating new,
novel predictions, some of which are ultimately borne out. To be rationally
up to snuff, then, a theology has to conform to the above Lakatosian picture-it must first have the basic research program structure and must evolve
according to its own heuristics, and, second, must ultimately be empirically
progressive.
The actual content of the various components-core, auxiliary hypotheses,
etc.-faces few substantive initial constraints. (After all the empirical progressiveness requirement will apply tighter and tighter substantive clamps on
the entire system as time goes on anyway.) Thus, in principle a theology hard
core might include the doctrine of the inspiration of Scripture, the concept
of God, beliefs concerning Christ, and other pieces from Christian tradition
and practice; auxiliary hypotheses might include doctrines for interpreting
Scripture and for evaluating religious experience; heuristics could indicate
directions for change in Scriptural interpretation when necessary. As a real
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example, Murphy presents an extended discussion of Roman Catholic modernism (Chapter 4). In that discussion, she attempts to identify hard core,
auxiliary hypotheses, heuristics, and so forth. Murphy concludes that the
development of Roman Catholic modernism does exhibit a genuine research
program structure.
The requirement of empirical progressiveness initially looks like a more
serious difficulty. Many are not accustomed to thinking of theology even as
empirical-let alone as generating empirical novelty. But the outer edges of
a Lakatosian theology structure will continually brush against the real world,
thus generating genuine empirical, theologically-relevant data. According to
Murphy (Chapter 5), such data are in fact available from a wide range of
sources, including Scriptural texts, social sciences, natural sciences, historical disciplines, religious practices, and even personal spiritual experiences.
Murphy accepts a 'holist' philosophy of science (Quinean web-like, and embracing Kuhn, Lakatos, Laudan, etc.), and thus sees data as deeply theory
laden-"seeing itself is influenced by what one knows" and "experience
comes interpreted" (p. 164). For one operating within a theistic research
program, then, data themselves can be theology-laden-and direct experiential, empirical judgements can make reference to God, to specific divine
activities in the world, etc. For instance,
God called Ignatius to the life of a celibate priest
counts as such data and, on Murphy's view, is "no more [theory-laden] than
the data in other sciences" (p. 175). Of course, Christians often have to
evaluate the legitimacy of such judgements, and here Christian discernment
(individual and communal, and itself involving various auxiliary hypotheses)
plays a crucial role. From such discernment emerge the key data necessary
for evaluating theological research traditions, and such data can "meet all the
standard requirements for scientific data" (p. 173).
Ultimately, of course, the whole system, theory-laden data included, is not
only called to empirical account but also must survive the Lakatosian progressiveness requirement. But if Murphy is right about the above empirical
and theoretical (or theological) melding, empirical progressiveness is at least
in principle possible, and thus in principle the theological theories which
theologically-freighted data support can meet the empirical demands which,
on this Lakatosian account, define science--even that of producing novel
empirical predictions. If all that is right, then neither Hume nor his more
recent descendants remain terrors for the Christian.
Again, Murphy has produced an impressive work. However, I have a
number of hesitations about it. First, some Christians may wonder why we
should concede that theism is rationally justifiable only if it can meet the
standards for probabilistic reason, and that theism should be tied formally to
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the empirical in a way appropriate to science. Murphy does not make an
extended case for that position, although Chapter 2 is a very positive treatment of Pannenberg, who did hold it and who on Murphy's view went off
track primarily because he operated with a defective philosophy of science.
But I have some sympathy for those who simply shrug off arguments that
their Christian belief doesn't meet the requirements of scientific rationality
(or our best theories of it), and continue happily on their believing way. A
demonstration that Christian belief could meet those requirements might be
great, both polemically and otherwise, but making those requirements normative for the rational acceptability of such belief is another matter.
Further, Murphy asserts more or less without argument that 'holist' theories
of scientific rationality (like Lakatos'S) have carried the day and are now
clearly the best such theories we have. (The only alternative even seriously
discussed is the Laudan variant of Lakatos). While they are certainly major
players, that such views are the clear winners in the discipline is not just
obvious, and it seems to me that we are not given any compelling case here.
But even if some holist theory were the best available theory of rationality,
is that the sort of view to which one should want to hitch one's theological
wagon? Like the Eastern cosmology according to which the foundations of
the earth are "elephants all the way down," holist views often tend to see
epistemology as interpretation all the way down, and that, of course, has
consequences for realism. Many such views in some sense tend to trade truth
for rationality. In the bad old days of classical foundationalism there was an
underlying conviction that if you went properly about your lawfully appointed epistemological business, you ended up with the truth. But with many
holist theories the underlying conviction seems to be that even if you perform
all such duties correctly, the best that you can reasonably hope for is the
rationality of your beliefs. It might, of course be rationally permissible for
the philosophically unsophisticated to believe-probably mistakenly-that
they had gotten to the truth. (Although, on Lakatos's own view, it is not
rational to think that one's scientific theories are true.) But surely an orthodox
theology could legitimately hope for a bit more robust realism than the mere
permissibility for the epistemologically uninitiated to hold the probably misguided belief that their theological views were true. Aren't we Christians in
effect staking our lives on Christian beliefs-at least the hard core-being
true?
Of course, holism comes in varieties and degrees, and some versions may
avoid such results. But Murphy seems to think that holism is the only alternative to classical foundational ism, and moreover that once one has accepted
any sort of holism, substantial theory-Iadenness automatically ensues. That,
it seems to me, overlooks other possibilities, including Plantinga's sort of
weak (corrigible) foundationalism (which Murphy seems to classify as a
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disguised form of holism dressed up in foundationalist language). But the
fact that data might turn out to be corrigible under suitable pressures does
not, it seems to me, show that the beliefs in question are not basic, nor that
the data are theory-laden in any significant sense.
But even if such holism were the approach of choice, Lakatos's version
presents further grounds for unease. In addition to Lakatos's problems with
truth (above), we might wonder why, really, we should accept no theology
which did not produce novel data predictions which were at least occasionally
borne out. If accused of holding a theology which hadn't made a novel
prediction in several centuries, I doubt that I would be too upset, and don't
see any good reason why I should be. Any good theology should perhaps be
capable of handling new data, of explaining human behavior in the face of
newly invented versions of old temptations, and so forth. But all of that could
perhaps be done by merely applying the old time religious theory to the new
situation, and would not necessarily involve either a shift in theory-progressive or otherwise--or any novelty whatever. Further, even if a theology were
empirically progressive, on a Lakatosian view one should at some point
abandon it if some rival theology were empirically more progressive. Indeed,
the rival needn't even be a theology. If some social scientist produced a
naturalistic account of 'religious experience' which was more progressive
than our theological account, that, says Murphy would be "bad news indeed
for theists" (p. 199). But that Lakatosian demands should be made normative
for theology, or that failure to meet such demands would be bad news for
theists, seems to me to need a stronger case than we are given.
Lakatos's view has come in for serious technical criticisms, and the ability
of his view to overcome those criticisms is surely relevant to its acceptability
as a norm for religious rationality. One such criticism involves Lakatos's
notion of novel fact. An adequate definition here is obviously important, since
evaluations of progressiveness or degeneracy-the heart of the theorydepend heavily upon whether or not the program generates novelty. Attempting to answer those criticism, Murphy proposes the following definition:
A fact is novel if it is one not used in the construction of the theory T that it
is taken to confirm. A fact not used in the construction of a theory is one
whose existence, relevance to T, or interpretability in light of T is first documented after T is proposed. (p. 68)
"Document" refers to the sorts of things that "historians most often rely
on" -permanent records, publications, etc. And since Murphy proposes the
above as a definition of 'novel fact,' I take the "if' in the first sentence to
mean "if and only if."
That definition, however, does not seem to work. As it stands, the definition
has the rather awkward consequence that any fact never in any way documented-or even never thought of-is used in the construction of every
theory. That is easily repaired, but there are more interesting problems. Sup-
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pose that a theorist uses (in an intuitive sense of that term) ten facts in the
construction of a theory. In the initial proposing of the theory, if only nine
were cited, then on the above definition belated documentation of the tenth
in the next issue of the journal would constitute novel corroboration-despite
that fact having been firmly in the theorist's mind in the process of theory
construction. Or suppose that a theorist although in constructing a theory
making no use of it (in an intuitive sense), happens to notice and to point out
in the initial proposal document that some well known fact in a hitherto
seemingly unrelated domain can be accounted for quite nicely by the new
theory. Intuitively, that fact is not used in the construction of the theory, and
does provide novel corroboration. However, the above definition would overrule both of those intuitions. Or suppose that the newly proposed theory
predicts some fact never before suspected, that fact being subsequently confirmed and documented. The fact is then novel, according to the above definition. However, suppose that it turns out that, although hitherto completely
unnoticed and unsuspected, the exact same fact is later shown also to be a
prediction of the old superseded theory. The new theory's prediction intuitively does not then indicate progressiveness, even though the fact is by the
above definition novel.
Many might also find Murphy's actual theological examples less than reassuring-even if she is right that they meet Lakatosian constraints. In the
view of many, modernism suffers from a policy-perhaps nearly is a policy-of progress via concession to reigning cultural zeitgeists. Thus, modernism might represent erosion of prior religious content-and thus theological
degeneration--despite some expansion of empirical content and empirical
progression. Is there some compelling reason to think that in any such case
empirical progressi veness must always be preferred, even at the cost of theological degeneration? In another of Murphy's examples, Paul's references to
principalities and powers are given a "fresh understanding," principalities
and powers being newly understood as referring not to spiritual beings but
to sociopolitical forces. That switch is presented as evidence of novelty and
progression in the "classical" atonement research program. That case also
makes me wonder if empirical progressiveness in theology might sometimes
come at a price which the honorific "progressive" might not be worth-especially in the absence, as it seems to me, of a compelling case that rationality
must be Lakatosian. It all calls to mind a line from Ogden Nash: progress
might have been all right once, but it has gone on far too long.
But again, Murphy's book is informed, informative and embodies an interesting-and novel--direct confrontation of the rational respectability issue
which has long generated uneasiness for countless believers. It is not clear
that she entirely succeeds. But such success has never been a necessary
condition for philosophical value.

